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Abstract  
 
 
Brazil’s trade and industrial policies in the last decade has taken an increasingly sharp turn 
towards boosting and protecting the local manufacturing industry, particular after the 2008 
financial crisis. This paper reviews these policies and their initial results and argues that, 
while they have brought some short-term relief, they have done so at the cost of 
undermining the fundamentals of long-term growth. The country’s recent lackluster 
economic performance—an unfortunate combination of high inflation, low growth, and a 
deteriorating current account deficit seem to confirm this view. 
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Introduction  
In the last two decades, Brazil has been exposed to important structural changes in 
the world economy that have posed major challenges to policymakers. Primary 
among them is the more competitive economic landscape, with the emergence of 
Asia, particularly China, as the “workshop of the world,” a growing intra-industry 
international division of labor in manufacturing, and an innovation/product 
differentiation race led by the U.S. and the more human capital-centered advanced 
economies. The problem of effectively responding to these changes was significantly 
compounded by the Great Recession and the ensuing slowdown in the world 
economy. Taking center stage in the debate is the future of Brazil’s manufacturing 
industry, squeezed between the currency appreciation of a commodity boom and an 
unforgiving competition. The tribulations of the manufacturing sector have touched 
a particularly raw nerve, since industrialization has been traditionally perceived as 
the country’s only path to development —a perception reinforced by Asia’s success 
stories. 
Amid a growing protest from industrialists and labor, and pressed by the industry 
lackluster domestic and foreign sales and growing import dislocation, the 
government has resorted in the last decade to a combination of preferential credit, 
                                                            
* This paper is an extended English version of article originally published in Fabio Giambiagi and Claudio Porto 
(eds.) Propostas para o governo 2015/2018. Agenda para um país prospero e competitivo. Elsevier, Rio de Janeiro. 2014 
** Respectively, President of Inter.B  Consultoria Internacional de Negócios  and IDB Integration and Trade 
Sector Principal Economic Advisor.  The views expressed herein are those of the authors alone and do not 
necessarily reflects the views of the Inter-American Development Bank or any of its member countries. 
2 
 
capital injections, fiscal incentives, and protectionist measures, ranging from tariff 
and non-tariff barriers to local content rules. The scale and breadth of these measures 
—which have clearly reached new heights since the Great Recession— seem to 
signal a break with past attempts at rationalizing and limiting government 
intervention to key or demonstrable market failures, and raise a number of as-yet 
unanswered questions. Is across-the-board protection and promotion of the 
manufacturing industry the best strategy to ensure that it remains a major source of 
growth and innovation in Brazil? Is such a strategy sustainable in view of the 
government’s limited fiscal resources? Is the targeting of specific sectors and firms 
consistent with the democratic principles of transparency, accountability, and 
equality of opportunities? To what extent does this strategy leverage the country’s 
resource endowments or, conversely, limit the growth possibilities allowed by them? 
How to avoid technological obsolescence, productivity stagnation and rent seeking 
that have been associated with these types of policies in the past? 
This paper argues that the answers to these questions do not seem to support the 
reshaping of policy that took place in the last decade. Whereas there is no doubt that 
it has brought some short-term relief, particularly  in the struggling manufacturing 
sector, it has done so at the cost of undermining the fundamentals of long-term 
growth, not to mention the damage to the country’s democratic governance. Brazil’s 
economic history as well as its lackluster economic performance after the recent 
financial crisis —an unfortunate combination of high inflation, low growth, and a 
deteriorating current account deficit, fueled by unwise policy interventions and poor 
management of expectations— seem to confirm this view. 
Rather than rehashing questionable policies of the past, the best way for the country 
to meet the challenges of a transformed world economy is to resume its attempts to 
streamline government intervention, whose limited resources should be focused on 
providing public goods, strengthening institutions, and addressing classic market 
failures in education, infrastructure, and science, technology and innovation 
(S&T&I). The country would also benefit from further trade liberalization to improve 
resource allocation and boost productivity. An open and competitive economy is the 
one best positioned to respond to the global challenges and opportunities brought 
about by the growing maturity, sophistication, and mobility of firms from both 
developed and emerging economies. Experience suggests that open-ended 
protection and government support is hardly conducive to systematic gains in 
productivity and innovation, consistent with the country´s comparative advantages. 
To the contrary, the absence of policies facilitating restructuring will most likely 
doom the country´s manufacturing sector. 
This paper is divided into four sections including this introduction. In the following 
section, we review the main policy changes in the product (taxes, subsidies, and 
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government procurement) and factor (credit, labor, and technology) markets, and 
make the case for resuming the rationalization of state intervention. Trade policy is 
the focus of the third section, where we argue that even a more selective and rational 
“industrial policy” would neither revive the fortunes of the manufacturing sector 
nor put the country in a sustainable growth path without the support of lower trade 
barriers at home and abroad. The last section sums up the main arguments and 
policy recommendations. 
Reshaping industrial policy in time of crisis 
In coming years Brazil will need to face the challenges of low investment, sluggish 
productivity growth, and insufficient innovation, most critical in the case of 
manufacturing. Rising wages have not been offset by productivity gains —resulting 
in a significant increase in unit labor costs for both the industrial and services 
sectors. Equally important have been the high costs beyond the factory gate, driven 
by weaknesses in infrastructure,1 the low quality of government services (in 
education, health care, and public safety), and a tax burden that is 15 percent of GDP 
higher than most other middle-income countries. Finally, low levels of integration 
into the global economy have been hindering the modernization of industry, with a 
negative impact on firms’ incentives and their ability to innovate.  
The key initiatives of the decade--To address these challenges – compounded by 
the Great Recession -, the government put together a number of sprawling policy 
initiatives  Three stand out:  the 2004 “Industrial, Technological and Foreign Trade 
Policy” (PITCE in the Portuguese acronym), the 2008 “Productive Development 
Policy” and the 2011 “Great Brazil Plan” (Plano Brasil Maior).  
The PITCE was the first and arguably best designed of the three initiatives for 
having its focus on innovation, while acknowledging the key role played by exports 
(though, not by imports) in fulfilling the program objectives.2 The two most 
important pieces of legislation were the “Innovation Law”--signed in December 
2004--which facilitated the collaboration between public research institutions and 
private firms;3and Law 11.196/05 (known as “The Good Law” or “Lei do Bem” in 
                                                            
1
 For many years, per capita investment in infrastructure has been below depreciation levels. It is usually acknowledged that 3 percent of 
GDP would be the minimum to offset per capita depreciation of infrastructure assets, based on the international experience.  See the 
discussion in Frischtak (2013).  
2See “Diretrizes de Política Industrial, Tecnológica e de Comércio Exterior” November 2003, 
availableathttp://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br .The emphasis on innovation resulted from a series of studies by the Brazilian Institute for 
Applied Economic Research (IPEA) that analyzed the determinants of Brazilian business performance. These studies suggested that 
innovation efforts involving brand building, distribution systems, and product differentiation are associated with increased export levels as 
well as with better-quality, more productive and better-paid jobs. For a historical approach to and tentative rationale for the PITCE, see 
Salerno and Daher (2006). 
3See http://www.mct.gov.br/index.php/content/view/8477/Lei_de_Inovacao.html 
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Portuguese), signed in December 2006, which granted fiscal incentives for research 
and development (R&D).4 
This legislation was complemented by other horizontal policies, mostly targeted at 
small and medium firms (SMEs) such as “the Statute of the Small and Medium 
Firm,”5 and by sectoral policies mainly designed to generate and disseminate 
information, and improve coordination between producers and users of technology. 
That was the case, for instance, with the development of “Brazil Technology 
Network”--focused on energy, oil, and gas--and other initiatives to support the 
software and pharmaceutical industries: initiatives that can be justified on 
knowledge spillovers and public health grounds.  
The PITCE also sought to lower the cost of capital goods through fiscal and financial 
incentives (including import tariff exemption for goods not produced in the country) 
and granted some additional incentives for high-tech sectors such as 
microelectronics, nanotechnology, and biotechnology.6 
As if sensing that the PITCE was falling short of its objectives, the government 
launched a new initiative in May 2008. The “Productive Development Policy”(PDP) 
shared some of the goals of the previous initiative—e.g., higher private spending on 
innovation—but added other significantly more ambitious and broader targets such 
as attaining a higher rate of investment and higher share of Brazilian exports in the 
world market. To achieve these goals, the PDP resorted again to a myriad of loosely 
connected policy measures, which consisted mostly of fiscal and financial incentives 
for investments in fixed capital, innovation, and exports, some of them targeted to 24 
“strategic” sectors, which in practice covered almost all economic activity. Some of 
these measures simply added to the welcomed tax reductions initiated by the PITCE, 
but on whole, the PDP relied more heavily on boosting the volume and reducing the 
cost of preferential credit channeled through official banks led by the National 
Development Bank (BNDES).7 
 
What is the estimated fiscal cost of both programs? For the PITCE, the Finance 
Ministry allocated R$ 37.6 billion for 2004-06, 0.6 percent of the GDP in the period. 
For PDP, the cost of tax exemptions was estimated at R$ 21.4 billion for 2008-10, or 
0.3 percent of GDP (excluding BNDES’ substantial interest rate subsidies). These 
costs—from 0.3 to 0.6 percent of GDP—though significant, would be dwarfed by the 
fiscal burden imposed by the post-Great Recession initiatives.   
                                                            
4
 See http://www.mct.gov.br/index.php/content/view/8586/Lei_do_Bem___Capitulo_III.html.  “Lei do Bem” aimed at reducing innovation 
costs through automatic income tax deductions and other tax incentives applicable to R&D. In addition it allowedgovernment entities to 
effectively share innovation risks with firms, by subsidizing the early phase of the innovation process. 
5See http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/lcp/lcp123.htm 
6See Salerno and Daher op. cit.  
7See CNI, “Avaliação da Política de Desenvolvimento Produtivo,” Brasilia, May 2008. 
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What was the impact of these programs? There is some evidence that instruments 
such as the 2006 Lei do Bem may have contributed to the rising trend of R&D 
expenditures in the second half of the last decade as shown in Table 1.Kannebley Jr. 
and Porto 2012, for instance, estimate that this law raised firms’ R&D expenditures 
by a modest, but statistically significant, 7 to 11 percent. There is not, however, any 
hard evidence about the impact of the PDP and this is hardly surprising as the onset 
of the Great Recession in September of 2008,and ensuing government anti-cyclical 
measures (see below),made any rigorous evaluation a challenging, if not impossible, 
task.  
What is clear is that the program was hardly promising, as it resorted to widespread 
intervention with little regard for comparative advantages or well-defined market 
failures. It is hard to see how measures that distorted relative prices and resources 
allocation, while reducing competition in the domestic market, could address the 
fundamental issues holding back Brazil’s economy such as low productivity growth, 
high infrastructure and regulatory costs, and a heavy tax burden.  
Table 1: Distribution of National Spending on R&D by Financing Sector 2000-2010 
(% of GDP) 
Sector 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Business 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.44 0.42 0.49 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.56 0.55 
Government 0.55 0.57 0.53 0.52 0.48 0.48 0.50 0.57 0.58 0.60 0.61 
Total 1.02 1.04 0.98 0.96 0.90 0.97 1.01 1.10 1.11 1.17 1.16 
Sources: www.mst.gov.br, General Coordination of Indicators (CGIN)-
ASCAV/SEXEC.   
 
The shortcomings of the PDP strategy would become more evident with the launch 
of the Brasil Maior Plan in 2011, fundamentally a scaled-up and more generous 
version of the PDP, based on a similar diagnosis of the nature of the problems faced 
by the Brazilian economy and its manufacturing industry.8 It involved a new and 
more comprehensive round of loosely connected discretionary tax and financial 
incentives, led by an even greater role for BNDES. While BNDES has been the 
instrument for the anti-cyclical policies since 2009, its balance sheet was already 
substantially larger prior to the crisis, driven in part by the support to “national 
champions” (Figure 1). 
                                                            
8For details of the PDP see  http://www.brasilmaior.mdic.gov.br/conteudo/129.  
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percent, a reflection not only of the Euro crisis, but also of domestic factors.  The 
primary budget surplus reached 3.1 percent of GDP, with changes in the cabinet-– 
some brought by corruption charges--adding to the normal difficulties in budget 
execution at the beginning of a new government, while rising labor costs and excess 
demand for services pressed inflation. 
To counteract the 2011 slowdown, the government shifted to policy hyperactivism, 
with an initial focus on the apparent overvaluation of the real, whose causes were 
attributed to a “currency war.” In a series of aggressive interventions, the Central 
Bank managed to reverse a decade-long trend of exchange rate appreciation, with 
the real devaluating by approximately 30 percent between July 2011 and July 2012.  
The Central Bank also shifted its monetary policy stance in August 2011, with its 
own brand of “ultramonetarism.” The benchmark interest rate (SELIC) was cut in 
little over a year by 5.25 percentage points to 7.25 percent--the lowest level the 
country had seen in decades--while the macro prudential policies in force since the 
end of 2010 were dismantled.11These moves were combined with the launching of 
Brasil Maior in August 2011, soon followed by an array of additional tax incentives 
(for firms and consumers). In parallel, BNDES continued to expand its balance sheet 
at a brisk pace, providing investment financing at subsidized rates. 
As growth decelerated further in 2012 (to 1 percent) and inflation remained at high 
levels (5.7 percent), the government’s reaction was to “double the bet,” in the hope 
that generous incentives for consumers and firms would revive animal spirits and 
push up investment. The thinking was that government expenditures would also 
help nudge the economy towards a path of consistent economic growth.12 At the 
same time, the government presumed that a combination of tax exemptions plus 
price controls would succeed in holding back inflation.13By early 2013, however, it 
became clear that policy activism had failed to boost growth, despite the ballooning 
fiscal costs, while inflation continued to rise. This unhappy combination eventually 
                                                            
11
 The Central Bank lowered from 16.5 to 11 percent the minimum capital requirement for consumer loans for a maximum 60-month term, 
and lowered the minimum credit card payment from 20 to 15 percent of the total credit card amount. The reduction of the SELIC benchmark 
interest rate, in view of the world economic crisis, was seen ex post as a correct measure, largely because it was accompanied by a larger 
budget surplus (3.11 percent of GDP in 2011), in fact the highest in the current  administration. 
12
 In 2012, the government decided to further involve public banks such as CEF and BB, in addition to BNDES, in increasing the lines of 
credit and forcing a drop in interest rates, and transferred  R$ 13 billion and R$ 8.1 billion to CEF and BB, respectively. Between 2008 and 
July 2013, the public banks’ share in total lending grew from 33 to 50.5 percent. At the same time, in June 2012, BNDES offered a special 
line of credit of R$ 20 billion to the states, and the limit of indebtedness of 21 states was expanded to R$ 58.3 billion for infrastructure 
investment. In the same month, the limit to the states’ participation in PPP contracts was increased from 3 to 5 percent of their net current 
revenues. 
13
 In March 8, 2013 Provisional Measure #609 zeroed federal taxes for a wide range of food and personal hygiene products after the inflation 
hike  at the beginning of the year, at an estimated fiscal cost of R$ 5.5 billion in 2013, and R$ 7.4 billion in 2014. In the case of gasoline and 
diesel oil, the subsidies associated with price controls were borne by Petrobras and the Treasury, the latter through the reduction of the CIDE 
(excise tax on fuels) at a cost of R$ 8.6 billion in 2012. 
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forced the government to begin rethinking its policy stance under the double threat 
of a cost of living escalation and the downgrading by rating agencies.14  
A closer look at the trust of policy hyperactivism reveals that most initiatives were 
directed towards: a reduction in the cost of investment; a lowering labor costs; and 
the stimulus of domestic consumption while minimizing import “leakage.” 
Investment Cost Reduction. To boost investment, the government adopted measures 
along two dimensions: First, the ample provision of soft financing, with BNDES 
spearheading the effort with the Investment Support Program (Programa de 
Sustentação do Investimento– PSI). The program was launched in January 2009, 
while the PDP was still in force. In August 2011, with Brasil Maior already in place, 
PSI was extended until December 2012, and BNDES received a R$ 55 billion loan 
from the Treasury (on top of the R$ 180 billion since 2009). In April 2012, the second 
phase of the plan extended PSI until December 2013, with an additional transfer of 
R$ 45 billion from Treasury to BNDES.15 
During 2012, the government gradually lowered BNDES’ most competitive long-
term interest rates (TJLP): at the end of June, TJLP fell to 5.5 percent (from 6 percent, 
set in June 2009), and in August 2012 to 5 percent. In parallel, the PSI interest rate for 
machinery, equipment, and trucks dropped from 5.5 to 2.5 percent. In 2013, the PSI 
rate began a slow ascent. In January it was set at 3 percent, and in the second half of 
the year at 3.5 percent (4 percent for buses and trucks), all of which was still 
significantly below the Treasury opportunity cost.16 Given that money is fungible, 
the availability of ample finance at negative real interest rates created incentives for 
opportunistic behavior: companies could in principle borrow from BNDES and pay 
out dividends, provided the cost of the loans was lower than the cost of the 
stockholders’ equity (as discussed below). 
The second dimension of the investment incentives involved broader and lengthier 
tax exemptions for capital goods, construction materials, and trucks and light 
                                                            
14The fiscal impact of the successive packages of incentives introduced by the government was felt from 2012 onwards, when the 
government had to resort to so-called “creative accounting” in order to attain the primary surplus target set in the Appropriation Act. The 
government considered as “savings” R$ 34 billion spent in the context of the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC), and added in December 
R$ 12.4 billion from the Sovereign Wealth Fund and R$ 7.7 billion in dividends from BNDES and CEF, with the primary surplus amounting 
to 2.38 percent of GDP (instead of 3.1 percent). In 2013, the situation worsened, as the primary surplus dropped 41 percent in the January-
September period vis-à-vis the year before, accounting for 1.28 percent of GDP. 
15
 In September 2013, the balance of the government loans to BNDES amounted to R$ 382.89 billion, i.e., 8.2 percent of GDP, of which PSI 
accounted for R$ 237 billion. In addition to PSI, BNDES runs with different rates and terms, a number of other programs. The Ministry of 
Finance estimates that the implicit subsidies granted by the Treasury to BNDES were R$ 11.8 billion and R$ 12.7 billion in 2011 and 2012, 
respectively; and projected to reach R$ 10.31 billion and R$ 15.67 billion in 2013 and 2014, respectively. The decrease of the SELIC 
benchmark interest rate in 2012 —and a reduction in the Treasury opportunity costs— limited the growth of subsidies in 2012, and the 
opposite should be taking place in 2014. The share of the BNDES portfolio in total lending is quite significant, just over 20 percent versus 
15.8 percent of the German development banks and 11.7 percent of the China Development Bank. For a positive assessment of the 
development role of BNDES in recent years, see Ferraz, Além and Madeira (2013),  
16
 Initially (July 2009, the PSI rates were set at 4.5 and 7 percent for machinery/equipment and trucks, respectively. In July 2010, they were 
raised to 5.5 and 8 percent and in April 2011 again increased to 8.7 and 10 percent. In 2012 the government reversed course, lowering the 
PSI rates in April to 7.3 and 7.7 percent, and in May to 5.5 percent. 
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commercial vehicles, extended until December 2013. In August 2012, the 
government allowed for the accelerated depreciation of capital equipment, reducing 
it from ten to five years.  In April 2012, REPORTO —a program to encourage 
investments in ports, roads, and railways by exempting them from the payment of 
import duties and indirect taxes--was broadened to include investments in 
warehousing, environmental protection, security, and monitoring (as long as  
domestic equipment was unavailable). Finally, the National Broadband Plan (Plano 
Nacional de Banda Larga) granted indirect tax exemptions for the purchase of 
domestic equipment and civil works related to the telecommunications network 
infrastructure. 
Reduction in Labor Costs. The most significant (and unprecedented) measure was 
adopted in August 2011 to encourage labor hiring.  The 20percent social security 
payroll tax was replaced by a 1.5 percent tax on revenues for selected labor intensive 
sectors: clothing, leather and footwear, software (2.5 percent) and call centers.17 In 
April 2012, the benefit was extended to another 11 sectors (textiles, furniture, 
plastics, electrical equipment, auto parts, bus, naval vessels, airplane, capital goods, 
hotels, chip design) and all the sectors started to pay 1 percent over gross revenues (2 
percent for software firms and call centers).18 By 2013, the payroll tax exemptions 
covered 42 sectors (including civil construction). Finally, in April 2013, the 
government proposed to extend them to 14 additional sectors (including transport, 
media, defense, infrastructure works, architecture and engineering services, 
machinery and equipment installation and maintenance). 
Consumption Incentives and Domestic Market Protection.  The dismantling of 
macroprudential measures by the Central Bank in October 2011 was followed in 
December 2011 by initiatives to stimulate consumer spending. They included a 
lower financial transaction tax (IOF) on consumer credit (from 3 to 2.5 percent), a 
temporarily lower IPI tax on major appliances (white goods such as fridges, ovens, 
and washing machines) and a similarly lower PIS/COFINS (and federal sales taxes) 
on pasta products. One year later, in August 2012, the government extended the IPI 
tax incentive until December 2012 for major appliances, furniture, panels, plates, and 
lamps. 
In May 2012, the IOF rate on consumer credit operations was again lowered to 1.5 
percent, and the Central Bank reduced the mandatory reserve requirements in the 
amount of R$ 18 billion. The purpose was to stimulate financing operations for the 
acquisition of cars and light commercial vehicles. Also in May 2012, the government 
                                                            
17
 The fall in INSS revenues is being compensated by transfers from the Treasury. 
18
 Exports were exempted, while in the same package launched in April, the payment of PIS/COFINS was deferred from April and May to 
November and December for auto parts, textiles, clothing, footwear, and furniture firms. 
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launched a new set of measures primarily concerned with the automotive industry, 
which involved a lower IPI rate for passenger vehicles (proportionally higher for 
vehicles with larger engines), which translated into lower prices as agreed with 
automakers.19 Finally, in April 2013, the IPI rate reduction was extended until the 
end of 2013.  
Claiming the need to stop the consumption incentives from leaking to imports, the 
government made a number of protectionist moves, beginning with the decision to 
raise the IPI rate on imported vehicles by 30 percentage points in September 2011.20 
In April 2012, on the grounds of leveling the playing field, the PIS/COFINS rates on 
competing imports for the sectors that received payroll tax exemptions were 
increased by a percentage equivalent to the new sales tax rate (1 to 2 percent). In 
August 2011, the Government Procurement Act (No. 12,349/2010) granted federal 
government bids a margin of preference of up to 25 percent to local manufacturing 
and services firms that complied with Brazilian technical standards.21 In June 2012, 
the “PAC Equipment” program was launched, increasing the public sector 
purchases of local equipment, vehicles, and machines by R$ 6.61 billion (for a total of 
R$ 8.43 billion in 2012).22 
Was this effort worth it? In 2008-09, a global liquidity crisis in the midst of great 
uncertainty called for rapid and effective responses, of a magnitude commensurate 
with the external challenges faced by the Brazilian economy. In such a context, the 
response of the Brazilian government —led by the Central Bank— proved both 
effective and low cost, very likely having prevented a deeper recession in 2009. Even 
in the absence of a counterfactual, the mild recession suffered by the Brazilian 
economy and the quick recovery suggest that the anti-crisis measures were timely 
and effective. 
However, in 2010, after the recession was over, the political cycle kept the 
expansionary policies in place, fueling further increases in public expenditure and 
credit, in addition to the tax exemptions already in force. The decision to keep the 
                                                            
19
 The IPI cut also applied to trucks and light commercial vehicles, and introduced as part of the investment incentive measures. 
20
 The Plano Brasil Maior comprises a wide range of protectionist measures: it shortens from 15 to 10 months the term to investigate 
antidumping practices and from 240 to 120 days the time frame to apply a provisional duty; proposes to enlarge the list of MERCOSUR 
exemptions by including 100 additional products; and advises public banks to finance only projects with minimum national content levels 
and involving employment creation. Furthermore, by virtue of this plan, the National Institute of Metrology, Quality and Technology 
(INMETRO) is responsible for ensuring that imported goods comply with domestic standards. The government also created Reintegra, a 
special schedule whereby exporters of locally manufactured goods receive a tax refund of 3 percent of the value of their exports within a 60-
day period, as an offset for tax payments along the value chain, if not otherwise exempted. 
21
 In April de 2012, margins of preference were provided to medicines (8 percent for two years); drugs and biologics (20 and 25 percent for 
5 years, respectively); and backhoes and road graders (10 and 18 percent, respectively, until December 2015). For medicines, drugs, and 
biologics, annual procurement was estimated at R$ 3.5 billion; for all other items, the amount was estimated at R$ 400 million. 
22
 It included: armored vehicles, missile launch vehicles, farm vehicles, agricultural supplies, and ambulances, among others. This had little 
impact in 2012 due to the low level of expenditure execution —of a total amount of R$ 8.4 billion, only R$ 2.4 billion were effectively 
paid— and to a larger number of contracts negotiated at the end of 2012 to guarantee the resources committed. See Valor, 01/18/2013, p. 
A5. 
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stimulus going was taken even though by the end of 2010 it was already clear that 
Brazil did not have a problem of slack demand. On the contrary, there were already 
signs of inflationary pressures coming from the goods and labor markets 
(unemployment fell to 6.7 percent in 2010 and to 6 percent by the end of 2011, while 
real wages were growing above productivity).  
Some of the measures taken were particularly at odds with this scenario of a tight 
labor market. The payroll tax exemption, for instance, in a context of virtual full 
employment and low productivity, probably reduced incentives to improve 
management efficiency and reallocate capital, postponing a desirable industrial 
restructuring, while encouraging demands for protection.  
Other initiatives clearly had conflicting objectives.  Consumer incentives in a context 
of low domestic savings and a growing current account deficit do not help sustain 
investments, the main goal pursued by PSI. In addition, while soft loans and tax 
incentives for the acquisition of capital goods and other fixed assets are likely to 
have encouraged investment, the net effect is not clear since they also increased the 
government’s financing needs, exerting pressure on long-term interest rates.  
It is not surprising then that in 2012—the first year in which incentives were fully in 
force — the economy expanded by only 1 percent and inflation reached 5.8 percent. 
The supply constraints seem to have been compounded by the uncertainty created 
by measures whose logic economic agents could not comprehend. In this process, 
not only investment projects were held back, but consumer confidence—already 
under strain by rising inflation and debt levels--was also eventually hurt.  
Furthermore, the greater incentives for firms and households to increase debt and 
reduce savings, as well as the clear deterioration of the public accounts, led to a 
major drop in national savings, particularly in the private sector (see Table 2), 
pushing the current account deficit to 3.7 percent of GDP in the second quarter of 
2013. The sharp drop in private savings is particularly worrying since it might be 
pointing to a substitution of firms’ retained earnings by heavily subsidized public 
funds. 23 
                                                            
23
 See Rocca and Santos Jr. (2013). An approximate and preliminary estimate by the authors suggests that almost R$ 20 billion of BNDES 
resources may have been used to offset the reduction in corporate savings in the form of retained earnings in a one-year period (second half 
of 2012--first half of 2013), and are likely to have been allocated to substitute distributed dividends. Using an average GDP of R$ 4.5 trillion 
in 2012-13 as a reference, the BNDES contribution to the increase investment financing —44 percent— would cover the difference between 
a private savings contraction of 2.94 percent of GDP and a reduction in investment of 1.94 percent of GDP, i.e., 0.44 percent of GDP. The 
low cost of PSI loans for firms vis-à-vis the stockholders’ capital cost would account for the behavior of businesses in increasing their 
leverage with BNDES resources (perhaps also with funds from other unidentified public sources). See Antonio Delfim Netto (“Queda da 
poupança privada”), in Valor, 19/11/2013, p. A2. 
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Table 2: Investment and Gross National Savings as a percentage of GDP  
 2010 2011 2012 2013 * 
Investment  20.24 19.73 17.64 18.06 
Private Investment  17.43 17.38 15.20 15.44 
Gross National Savings 17.53 17.23 14.77 14.37 
Private Savings 19.16 18.75 16.05 15.81 
Source: Rocca and Santos Jr., op. cit., Annex 1. (*) 1stsemester. 
The results in terms of productivity were also disappointing. Modest labor 
productivity gains24 combined with rising incomes led to a substantial increase in 
unit labor costs. In many sectors, productivity has been stagnant or even declined 
(Table 3). 
Table 3: Brazil: Value Added per Employee by Broad Sectors, 1995-2010. 
 
 
1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Agriculture 1.36 1.37 1.45 1.42 1.51 1.64 1.62 1.66 
Mining 1.78 3.81 5.55 5.55 4.76 6.23 3.61 6.20 
Manufacturing Industry 0.90 0.92 0.98 0.93 0.90 0.90 0.93 0.91 
Construction 1.21 1.32 1.31 1.19 1.13 1.01 1.02 0.99 
Trade and Services  1.11 0.92 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.87 0.85 
Public Administration 0.51 0.47 0.49 0.52 0.56 0.59 0.59 0.62 
 
Sources: Prepared by the authors based on data from RAIS, IBGE and IPEAData. 
Poor economic performance was accompanied by –- and to a great extent resulted 
from -- the significant fiscal and economic costs of all these initiatives. While 
estimating these costs is not a simple matter because of the large number, 
                                                            
24
 According to The Conference Board Total Economy Database (January 2013), the average annual variation (in %) of GDP (USD PPP) per 
person employed between 1996 and 2012 was 0.91 percent for Brazil. In contrast, it was 1.68 percent for the U.S.; 1.77 percent for 
Thailand; 1.82 percent for Indonesia; 2.14 percent for Malaysia; 3.19 percent for South Korea; 4.87 percent for India; and 8.36 percent for 
China.   
13 
 
complexity, and ongoing nature of most of these measures, some of the estimates 
available leave no doubt about the magnitude of resources involved. The payroll tax 
substitution, alone, for instance, quickly escalated from an estimated 0.4 percent of 
GDP in 2013 to a projected 0.7 percent of GDP in 2014.25 
Overall, it seems clear that after the initial shock of the financial crisis, which 
required emergency demand-support measures, government policy should have 
shifted towards improving the supply side of the economy. The financial crisis did 
not change the fact Brazil’s growth constraints are basically structural in nature and 
are not to be overcome by temporary tax relief or financial incentives--particularly if 
they are undertaken on a piecemeal basis, and are not part of a broader policy 
framework which guides specific actions. These need to be designed to encourage 
resources to flow to areas which the country has clear or effectively emerging 
comparative advantages or focused on relevant market failures.  
Another important concern is with the exit from these policies. When the 
government finally comes to terms with their poor results, it will likely face fierce 
resistance against the elimination of incentives that tend to benefit just a few sectors 
or firms. As Mancur Olson warned in his classic work, concentrated benefits, even if 
not in the public interest, tend to linger, so long as their costs are widely dispersed 
across society. 26 Thus, policies that attempt to shift resource allocation in the 
economy should be ex-ante assessed on a cost benefit basis. A system of regulatory 
reviews needs to be instituted to ensure ex-post that such policies still serve the 
public interest. 
Looking for alternatives--When it comes to resuming long-term sustainable growth, 
there are clearly “Pareto superior” alternatives to policies that prevailed in the last 
decade, particularly after the financial crisis.27To begin with, any successful policy 
intervention asks for a clear strategy, focusing on well-defined objectives that are 
consistent with market failures and the government’s ability to address them. A 
loose cannon strategy should be avoided at all costs. What is the core, structural 
problem of Brazil’s economy? Supply side constrains driven by low investment, 
productivity and innovation, which as a whole undermine the competitive position 
of Brazilian firms in the domestic and international markets. A good place to start 
would be to communicate a credible strategy designed to revamp Brazil’s insertion 
in the global economy. Economic agents must be convinced that the government has 
                                                            
25
 The first government estimate of its fiscal cost was R$ 4.3 billion for 2012, and R$ 7.2 billion for 2013 and 2014. More recently, IBRE -
Getulio Vargas Foundation, put them at R$ 18.7 billion and R$ 34.8 billion in 2013 and 2014, respectively. See Afonso and Leal de Barros 
(2013).  
26
 See Olson 1965.  
27
 A contemporary discussion of the future of the Brazilian industry and the role of industrial policies is found in Bacha and Bolle (2013), 
and in Canedo Pinheiro (2013). The latter reviews the rationale and limitations of industrial policies. 
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a clear understanding of the problems facing the economy, and the industrial sector 
in particular, and is willing to risk political capital to solve them. 
What would be the essence of this strategy? The evidence available seems to indicate 
that competition is vital to boost productivity and innovation in the medium to long 
term.28Thus, industrial policy should facilitate the entry of new actors by reducing 
the barriers to competition. It should also promote exports, as the global market 
offers economies of scale and is competitive enough to stimulate the assimilation 
and use of new knowledge. Finally, the strategy should aim at the removal of 
protectionist barriers and subsidies, which are usually captured and perpetuated by 
well-organized sunset and low productivity industries. 
This strategic direction has clear implications and political costs. For example, public 
funds should not be spent to strengthen the market power of existing players, to 
shield them from competition, or even to create “national champions” that rarely 
play the disruptive role of Schumpeterian firms. Nor should they be used to distort 
relative prices to support activities in which the country clearly has no static or 
dynamic competitive advantages. 
We do not need to go any further than Brazil’s own poor record to understand the 
risks of this type of policy. The most notorious failure was the attempt to create a 
captive market for local computer firms in the mid-1980s, whose welfare and 
productivity costs can hardly be underestimated.29This painful experience led to 
more benign IT policies in the early nineties, under the umbrella of the Informatics 
Law (Law 8248)--later the subject of several amendments--which opened the sector 
to foreign competition, but that tied a number tax and R&D incentives to 
cumbersome local content rules. Not surprisingly, a recent rigorous evaluation of the 
Law could not find any significant statistical impact on R&D expenditures.30These 
difficulties, however, did not stop renewed attempts to target the local industry, 
such as the recent decision to spend considerable additional public resources on 
wafer manufacturing, even after the (catastrophic) experience with CEITEC 
(National Center for Advanced Electronic Technology) in Porto Alegre (and its 
proposed updated replica in Belo Horizonte).31 
What should be done instead is to promote entrepreneurship, facilitate the start-up 
of new businesses, and encourage the creation of ecosystems linking sources of 
                                                            
28
 See, for example, Baumol (2002) and Frischtak et al. (1989). 
29
 In this regard, see Luzio and Greenstein (1995), who analyze the substantial welfare losses that arise when industries are unable to rapidly 
catch up to the technology frontier despite initial productivity gains. For a successful case in the aircraft industry, see Frischtak (1994). 
30
 See Kannebley Jr. and Porto (op. cit). A recent audit by the Federal Audit Court makes it clear that the Law not only is poorly designed, 
but the implementation is deeply flawed. See AcordãoTC 013.747/2013-4 http://ow.ly/vmDxt 
31See, e.g. http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/impresso,estatal-de-chips-leva-10-anos-para-estrear,517168,0.htm and 
http://convergenciadigital.uol.com.br/cgi/cgilua.exe/sys/start.htm?infoid=32394&sid=7#.UyOA1qlDt8E 
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knowledge (universities, research institutes, technical schools), financing from the 
public and the private sector (angel financing, venture capital), and the provision of 
basic infrastructure. The latter include technology parks, business incubators, and 
hash spaces, associated with high-speed connections. In the latter case, it is essential 
that communication service providers build the backbone to ensure universal access 
to high-speed broadband connections. 
Though a potential source of growth opportunities, the IT sector is, perhaps, just a 
niche amid Brazil’s wide array of comparative advantages. There is probably a lack 
of understanding of what these advantages are and how to make the most of them. 
Brazil has a privileged endowment of biodiversity and natural resources, and it can 
produce, with a high degree of efficiency, biomass, and agricultural and mining 
products, in addition to conventional and renewable energy. Gone are the times of a 
country centered on the “exports of primary products” by isolated enclaves. These 
days, the processing of natural resources has little of “primary production” and a lot 
of research, development, engineering, logistics, and the capacity to sell both in 
commodity markets, and more often, to the final consumer. Moreover, clusters of 
more sophisticated activities flourish around the production of commodities. These 
will develop to the extent the country counts on a skilled workforce and a favorable 
business environment, as in Canada, Australia, Norway, Sweden, Finland, among 
others.32 
Despite all this potential, government policies have often been more of a hindrance 
than a help. For instance, price controls and subsidies to gasoline and diesel, part of 
a dubious (and ineffective) anti-inflationary policy, led to a major setback for 
investments in ethanol and biomass. Its adverse effects have been felt not only by 
Petrobras—Brazil’s dominant state-owned oil company-- but also on the sugar cane 
value chain. As long as the consumers’ decision to use ethanol (in flexible-fuel 
vehicles) depends on the price ratio between ethanol and gasoline, price controls on 
the latter have a direct impact on the demand for ethanol (and on its prices). As a 
result, sugarcane cultivation, sugarcane field renovation, investments in new plants 
and, consequently, biomass and ethanol production have been discouraged. And a 
whole array of industrial activities in related capital goods and input industries has 
been adversely affected. Furthermore, the policy uncertainty has discouraged 
investments in a myriad of activities that are intensive in engineering and scientific 
knowledge, by affecting the price and supply elasticity of the two basic elements of 
the value chain: biomass and ethanol. 33 
                                                            
32
 For an analysis of the role of industrial policy in the promotion of clusters, see Rodríguez-Clare (2007). 
33Fuel price controls have also undermined many of the potential benefits of the Program in Support of Innovation in the Sugar-Alcohol 
Sector (Programa de Apoio à Inovação no Setor Sucro-Alcooleiro – PAISS). PAISS, a joint BNDES-FINEP initiative, was launched in 2011 
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Rather than an isolated case, this kind of policy misstep seems to be part of a more 
general trend since early in the last decade whereby government intervention, either 
directly or indirectly—e.g., because of the uncertainty they create—tend to have a 
significant adverse impact on investment decisions and on the efficiency of resource 
allocation in the Brazilian economy. The cumulative effects of such missteps are now 
observable in the current combination of low growth and   high inflation that seems 
to characterize the economy at mid-decade.  
A trade policy reversal 
Splitting the analysis into industrial and trade policies might be analytically 
convenient, but it gives the false impression that these policies have intrinsically 
different objectives. They do not. They are both about government intervention in 
resource allocation in order to promote economic growth and increase welfare. The 
difference lies mainly in the instruments used and their efficiency. It is definitely not 
helpful if these policies point to conflicting directions, with offsetting results. Nor is 
it helpful if they point in the same direction, but based on a questionable diagnosis. 
Brazil’s experience in the last decade had elements of both. 
Protection at home--To begin with, there seems to have been a clear change in the 
goals of the country’s trade policy. If in the 1990s, the aim was to integrate Brazil into 
the global markets, with a decisive push to remove tariff and non-tariff barriers, in 
the 2000s, the goal seems to have shifted towards protecting local industry.34It can be 
argued that the turning point was the decision to extend the imposition of PIS-
COFINS--one of Brazil many indirect taxes--to imports in 2004.35 As shown in Figure 
2, this “simple” measure, when combined with the import tariffs applied to non-
MERCOSUR countries, doubled the average protection on local production.  It 
effectively took the country back to levels of protection not seen since the start of the 
liberalization of the economy in the early 1990s, whose phase-out took at least a 
decade.36 
Figure 2 also reveals that this measure worsened the already chaotic structure of 
protection that had unfortunately survived the liberalization, which can only be 
attributed to the clout of specific interests.37 What economic argument can be made 
to justify the decision to grant 50 percent protection to the automotive industry and 
less than half of that to the food industry? 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
and is primarily targeted at firms engaged in R&D. It supports both incremental and radical innovations (such as second-generation ethanol) 
in a sector where the country has clear comparative advantages.   
34See Moreira (2009) for a more detailed analysis of Brazil’s trade policy post- trade liberalization.  
35PIS and COFINS are federal taxes imposed monthly on firms gross revenue. PIS and CONFINs rates for most goods are, respectively, 
1.65 and 7.6 percent. http://www.receita.fazenda.gov.br/pessoajuridica/pispasepcofins/ 
36
 The MFN rate of duty in 1991 was almost 21 percent (WITS-TRAINS). 
37
 Such a striking variation among sectors is even more absurd when the so-called effective rates of protection are estimated. The variation in 
such cases may range from 180 percent for automobiles to –5 percent for the alcohol sector. See Castilho et al. (2009). 
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to import tariffs higher than 25 percent, for instance, tripled, between 2000 and 
2012.41Non-tariff barriers—long abandoned since the liberalization—also made a 
comeback. The most striking cases were the 30 percentage point increase in the IPI 
for imported cars and the up-to-25 percent margin of preference for local firms in 
government procurement, both already mentioned in our analysis of Plano Brasil 
Maior. The IPI increase was later repackaged as the “new automotive regime,” as a 
growing number of trade partners questioned its legality under the WTO regulations 
(Decree 7819, October 2012).42The margins of preference can be seen as a part of a 
broader trend towards increasing local content requirements, led by the state-owned 
Petrobras and the ANP-- the oil and gas regulatory agency.43 
Limited market access abroad--The focus on protecting the local industry also seems 
to be behind the country’s failure to improve its access to global markets. Despite the 
growing proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs)in Latin America and 
around the world, Brazil has not gone beyond MERCOSUR, which dates back to the 
early 1990s, except for a number of very limited deals with countries such as India, 
South Africa, and Israel. The result is local exporters, particularly manufacturers, 
facing tariffs in key regional and global markets that can be significantly higher than 
those paid by their direct competitors.  
To make matters worse, MERCOSUR seems to have lost momentum, weakened, on 
the one hand, by the increasing protectionism of its major economies and, on the 
other, by the accession of countries with diverging economic policies and regulatory 
frameworks. Given its dominant role, Brazil’s recent trade policy is particularly 
damaging for the bloc’s long-term prospects since it makes the adoption of a more 
rational common external tariff---one that could minimize the costs of trade 
diversion for the smaller members--all the more unlikely.  
Behind the reversal—The motivation behind Brazil’s recent trends in trade policy 
seems to be driven by concerns about currency appreciation, unfair competition 
(China and other Asian countries), or by the need to respond to an alleged 
widespread activism on the part of national States. These concerns tend to be 
aggravated   by the deep-seated perception that manufacturing is the country’s only 
available engine of growth. 
It seems reasonable to argue that these concerns are rooted in Asia’s rapid growth, 
particularly in the growth of China and India, which are flooding the manufacturing 
goods market with rock-bottom prices, while boosting the demand for raw 
materials--the prices of which have reached historical peaks. Despite many 
                                                            
41
 See Baumann and Kume (2013). 
42Under the “new automotive regime”, all producers, local or otherwise, are submitted to the higher IPI, unless they meet certain conditions 
such as having local production, with a high level of local content, invest 0.5 % of gross revenues in P&D and meet a certain criteria of 
energy efficiency. See http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2012/Decreto/D7819.htm 
43
 See Tordoet al. (2013). 
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assurances to the contrary, this phenomenon does not seem to put Brazil under the 
threat of a classical “Dutch disease,” defined by a temporary commodity boom that 
leads to a permanent destruction of the manufacturing industry.44 On the contrary, 
the evidence points not to a cyclical change, but to a structural break in the trend of 
relative prices between manufacturing goods and commodities, similar to one 
driven by the U.S.’ emergence at the beginning of the last century, except that this 
time it is in the opposite direction.45 
In this scenario, a protectionist shock, such as the one Brazil has been experiencing, 
seems to be particularly counterproductive and damaging. It will literally freeze the 
economy’s current structure in place, eliminating the incentives for an adjustment to 
the new realities of the world economy. It will prevent resources from flowing into 
more natural resource-intensive sectors, where the best opportunities for growth and 
productivity gains seem to lie. Rather than standing in the way of this adjustment, 
the State should serve as a catalyst, focusing on market failures in human capital, 
technology, or infrastructure that can prevent the development of more 
technologically sophisticated, resource-intensive sectors, such as petrochemicals and 
biotechnology. 
In this scenario, it is unlikely that manufacturing, in particular labor-intensive 
manufacturing, will ever recover their historical GDP shares—the more so because 
those shares reflected draconian levels of protection and significantly lower per 
capita incomes. True, this decline might have a short-term negative impact on 
employment and productivity, but these costs would pale in comparison to those 
that can be brought by a closed economy. In the long term, short-term setbacks can 
be more than be offset, on the one hand, by the exploitation and industrialization of 
natural resources--as has been the case of Australia, Canada, or even the U.S. --and, 
on the other, by the creation of high-productivity service jobs, which presently 
account for 60 percent of Brazil’s total employment.46 
There is no doubt that higher protection produces an immediate sense of comfort, as 
the rents created by the customs barriers attract investments—including foreign 
direct investments, as has been the case in the auto sector recently. Unfortunately, as 
Brazil’s own history has shown, this sense of comfort is short-lived, and sooner or 
later it will result in expensive products, outdated technologies, stagnated 
productivity, and an increasing demand for subsidies to sustain investments that are 
unsustainable in an open economy.47 
                                                            
44
 See Corden (1984). 
45
 For a more detailed discussion, see Moreira et al. (2012). 
46
 IBGE, Contas Nacionais 2009. 
47
 Rios and Araújo Jr. (2012), for example, show that, in the last 15 years, the best-performing sectors have been those with the highest 
import penetration rate. 
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Rejecting protectionism and enabling the economy to adjust to a much changed 
world economy does not mean, however, that the government should not intervene 
to minimize, for example, exchange rate volatility, as Brazil’s Central Bank has been 
doing. What definitely does not make sense is to use import tariffs to achieve the 
same objective, particularly if this involves sector-specific increases, altering relative 
prices. Not only would resource allocation be distorted in a way that does not 
happen with exchange rate fluctuations, but because tariffs gains are concentrated 
and costs widely dispersed, they can be easily raised but it takes a great deal of 
political will to bring them down. The recent devaluation of the real, which dropped 
by nearly 30 percent between 2011 and 2013, illustrates this point. If higher 
protection was motivated by currency appreciation, why was there no movement to 
bring tariffs down after the devaluation? The fact that the country took more than 
half a century to begin dismantling its protectionist apparatus also speaks to this 
point. 
Likewise, having an open and flexible economy does not prevent the government 
from intervening in flagrant cases of unfair competition, resorting to trade defense 
instruments and multilateral bodies, especially the WTO. What cannot be done is to 
use the violation of international trade rules by third countries as a justification to 
change the country’s own trade policy, particularly if it involves adopting similar 
prohibited practices. That not only hurts the country economically, but also 
undermines the credibility of any of its claims against illegal trade practices. Instead 
of a tit-for-tat, the dominant strategy would be to engage in a more aggressive trade 
diplomacy, as was exercised against the U.S. in the case of cotton.48 
Responding to Asia’s activism by increasing state intervention beyond trade policy 
makes even less sense. Aside from the arguments already made above, some of 
which are also valid in this case, at least three others should be taken into account: i) 
Brazil’s latest experience with state intervention ended with runaway inflation and 
decades of stagnation; ii) “picking winners,” particularly at the firm level, is 
incompatible with democratic institutions of a; and iii) the relatively modest 
resources of Brazil’s treasury vis-à-vis those of China do not suggest that the country 
has much to gain from a tit-for-tat strategy, with the additional cost of destroying the  
legitimacy of any of its unfair competition claims.49 
In summary, instead of looking for inspiration in past practices, whose results were 
far from successful--to say the least--Brazil would have much to gain if its trade 
policy were to resume earlier efforts to better integrate the country into the world 
economy. Addressing this unfished agenda would involve pursuing at least four 
major objectives: (a) bring import tariffs to the OECD average level of 6 percent for 
                                                            
48See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds267_e.htm 
49
 For a more detailed discussion of these assertions, see Moreira (2011). 
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all sectors; (b) subject changes in import tariffs to congressional approval; (c) change 
the status of MERCOSUR from a custom union to a free trade zone, as  there is no 
clear convergence among members over trade or macroeconomic policies; and 
finally (d) establish effective and expedited negotiations with other regional blocs in 
the region (Pacific Alliance) and elsewhere in North America (NAFTA), Europe (EU) 
and Asia (ASEAN, Korea and Japan) in order to open markets for local industry and 
reduce their disadvantage to competitors.   
Conclusion 
Over the last decade, government intervention has made a steady comeback in 
Brazil, reaching its peak in the years after the financial crisis. Both industrial and 
trade policies have taken an increasingly sharp turn towards boosting and protecting 
the local manufacturing industry at all costs. There has been a massive increase in soft 
loans, often targeted at specific sectors and firms; a vast and overlapping array of fiscal 
incentives has been introduced, often with conflicting objectives; there has been the forceful 
use of government procurement and local content rules to favor local firms; and, finally, there 
has been the brazen use of tariff and non-tariff barriers to thwart import competition. 
This sharp turn seems to have been originally motivated by the need to respond to 
important structural changes in the world economy, which has put considerable 
pressure on the local manufacturing industry, squeezed between a commodity boom 
and intensive Asian competition. However, this motivation was compounded by the 
demands of the financial crisis and the Great Recession, which elicited a response 
that went well beyond classical anti-cyclical policies. It effectively escalated 
government intervention in resource allocation to an extent not seen since the 
heyday of the import substitution in the 1970s. 
This paper has argued that widespread government interventionism hardly the best 
response to help local industry adapt to the changes in the global economy. Nor is it 
the best strategy to put the economy back into a path of sustainable growth. The 
growing spaghetti bowl of fiscal and credit incentives distorts relative prices, 
preventing resources from flowing to the most promising and productive 
investment opportunities. It undermines competition, reducing the incentives to 
increase productivity and innovate; it adds considerable uncertainty to expected 
rates of return, holding back investment; and it complicates the management of fiscal 
and monetary policies, putting macroeconomic stability at risk.  
The poor productivity and growth results of these policies so far seem to lend 
considerable weight to these arguments; even more so if the growing fiscal costs and 
related inflation and balance of payment imbalances are taken into account. Rather 
than resorting to an aggressive expansion of government intervention--which in 
many ways resembles the failed policies of the past--Brazil would be better prepared 
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to face the challenges of the new world economy if the government were to resume 
trade liberalization and concentrate its limited resources on providing public goods, 
strengthening institutions, and addressing classic market failures in education, 
infrastructure, and innovation.  
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